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INTRODUCTION
The robust and reliable determination of a user position
and time is crucial for civil GNSS applications with safety
content, such as aircraft landing or maritime navigation in
a harbor. Also many strategically important infrastructures,
such as electric power grids or mobile communications
networks, are becoming increasingly dependent on GNSS
services. The so called spoofing-threat, i.e. transmission of
a fake signal to intentionally fool receiver measurements,
became a prominent subject of study in the community during
the past years. In contrast to military GNSS users which solve
the spoofing problem to a large extent by utilizing encrypted
signals, civil users have to live today, and most probably
in the near and mid future, with unencrypted signals of open
GNSS services. The vulnerability of several commercial civil
state-of-the-art receivers has been exploited in [1]. Users of
such receivers can benefit strongly from additional receiver-
sided techniques, which are able to detect and mitigate
spoofing attacks.
Adequate solutions for the GNSS spoofing problem are
the subject of intensive research. A number of receiver-
autonomous spoofing detection techniques have been pro-
posed, see for example [2], [3], [4] and references herein.
In order to detect the presence of a spoofing attack these
techniques rely on the observation of the signal power,
the Doppler frequency offset, the PRN code delay and its
change rate, the correlation function shape as well as the
cross-correlation of the signal components at different car-
rier frequencies. Advanced protection against even the most
sophisticated spoofing attacks can be provided by the use of
multiple antennas. This comes from the fact that the carrier
phases of a signal, observed at different antennas, depend on
the direction of arrival of the signal [5]. Using this, a receiver
with an antenna array is able to estimate the directions of
arrival of the GNSS signals and detect the spoofing attack,
as long as a large part of the signals come from a single
direction. Moreover the malicious signals can be mitigated
by generating a spatial zero in the array antenna reception
pattern in the direction of the spoofing source.
The use of the multi-antenna based approach for spoofing
detection and mitigation was investigated by the authors in
[6] and [7]. A technique for joint spoofing detection and an-
tenna attitude estimation by using estimated signal directions
of arrival was developed. This technique was implemented in
an experimental receiver [8] with an adaptive antenna array
where the direction-of-arrival (DoA) is estimated for each
tracking channel at the post-correlation stage. On the one
hand DoA information is used to constrain the digital beam-
forming process. On the other hand the proposed technique
uses this information also for detection of spoofing attacks.
The detection is based on testing the observed DoAs of the
satellite signals against the predicted DoAs. The latter are
obtained in the local east-north-up (ENU) coordinates while
solving the PVT problem and using the computed satellite
positions and user position solution. Because the attitude
of the antenna array in the local ENU coordinates is not
necessarily known, the spoofing detection is therefore treated
as a joint detection (i.e. of the spoofing attack) and estimation
(i.e. of the attitude) problem. It was practically demonstrated
that the observed DoAs can be used to identify the direction
of the spoofing source and produce a spatial null in the array
reception pattern for mitigating this type of radio frequency
interference.
However the technique developed in [6] and [7] still suffers
from the effects of short-term inaccuracies in the direction
of arrival estimation occurring during the spoofing attack.
On the one hand the algorithm itself can be improved by
advanced techniques. On the other hand this problem can be
effectively solved by using a sequential estimation approach
for the array attitude combined with an adequate user motion
model. The results of practical tests reported in [7] also
indicate that the DoA estimation performance under spoofing
attack should be improved in order to maintain reliable
spoofing detection and to point a spatial null toward the
spoofing source.
This paper presents the results of an investigation aimed
at the improvement of the robustness of the joint attitude
estimation and spoofing detection by utilizing a sequential
approach for solving the estimation problem. First an updated
mathematical model for the DoA-based attitude estimation
is proposed in Section I. Further in Section II a closed-
form solution for this problem by using singular value
decomposition (SVD) is formulated. Later in Section III the
inspection of the obtained singular values is explored for
the detection of anomalies in the DoA measurements. Using
the results presented in Sections II and III, a snapshot-based
approach for joint attitude estimation and spoofing detection
is presented in Section IV. The proposed approach for the
extension from the snapshot-based to the sequential attitude
estimation is described in Section V. The assessment of the
practical performance of the proposed sequential estimation
approach by using realistic field test data is performed in
Section VI. Some conclusions and outlook which are given
in the last Section VII conclude the paper.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The system under consideration utilizes an antenna array.
This enables the receiver to estimate the elevation and az-
imuth of the tracked and de-spreaded GNSS ranging signals
separately. The navigation messages decoding and the PVT
calculation are assumed to be available. Fig. 1 shows the
generic system setup.
The goal of this research is to get a reliable estimate of
the receivers attitude w.r.t. to a local east-north-up coordi-
nate frame. The corresponding signal model and estimation
algorithm are described in this section. A detailed derivation
is presented since a deeper analysis of the attitude estima-
tion problem automatically leads to detection schemes for
anomalies which can be used for spoofing mitigation.
The measured sets of direction of arrivals (azimuth and
elevation) are transformed into unit vectors pointing from
the user to the satellites. These are denoted by bj ∈ R3 and
collected in the set B = {bj}j∈J . They are represented in a
local antenna coordinate system (details can be found in [9]).
J denotes the set of corresponding PRN-numbers of satellites
with available measurements.
A GNSS receiver capable of performing a PVT-solution is
also able to calculate unit vectors pointing from the user to
the satellites using ephemeris information. The single vectors
ai ∈ R3 are collected in the set A = {ai}i∈I . These vectors
are represented in a local east-north-up coordinate frame. I
denotes the set of PRN numbers, which are evaluated by
the receiver. If it is assumed that the almanac information is
available for all tracked satellites J is a subset of I .
Fig. 1: Blockdiagram of the generic system setup
The local antenna coordinate frame is a rotated version
of the local geodetic east-north-up frame. This yields the
following equation for all available pairs of measurements
K = J ∩ I for the error free case:
bk = Rak ∀k ∈ K (1)
The rotation is described by a rotation matrix R ∈ SO(3)
(see [10], SO(n) = {X ∈ Rn×n|XXT = I ∧ det(X) =
1}). It contains the information about roll, pitch and yaw
and therefore defines the current attitude. This rotation (i.e.
attitude) is a property of the GNSS receiver at a certain time
instant and therefore is common for all pairs of unit vectors.
Measurement Model
Since the change in the user position is very small com-
pared to the distance of the user to the satellite, the ephemeris
based DoAs {ai}i∈I are assumed to be perfectly known.
The antenna array based measurements however suffer from
imperfections. In [9] these imperfections are modeled by
using additive Gaussian noise (nk ∼ N (0, σI)), yielding:
bk = Rak + nk ∀k ∈ K (2)
It is remarkable that if the corresponding vectors ak and bk
are unit vectors and both are rotated versions of each other, in
a strict sense Eq.(2) cannot hold without further restrictions
on the noise.
Since the noise affects the estimated angle of arrival, it
seems convenient to model it using rotation matrices as well:
bk = RkRak︸︷︷︸
a
′
k
∀k ∈ K (3)
This rotational noise Rk affects all measurements differ-
ently. The rotation matrix can be constructed choosing a
random rotation axis ωk and choosing a random rotation
angle αk for each measurement.
Snapshot based problem statement
The ultimate goal of the algorithm is to perform a compu-
tation of the rotation matrix (which corresponds to the current
attitude) and to detect anomalies in the DoA measurements
(which could be caused by “spoofing” or meaconing).
Using the noise model described in Eq.(3), the following
set of equations for the N = |K| different pairs of measure-
ments can be stated:
b1 = R1Ra1
...
bk = RkRak
...
bN = RNRaN (4)
In the following, B ∈ R3×N and A ∈ R3×N denote
matrices consisting of the available DoAs in their columns.
Following the maximum likelihood principle, one is inter-
ested to minimize the noise of the measurement rotation.
Therefore the distance of the rotated versions of Rkak and
the unaffected ones ak is to be minimized.
Since the noisy rotations are assumed to be independent
for different unit vectors, a measure g(·) for this distance is
employed for each unit vector. The results are summed up,
yielding the following cost function for the antennas attitude:
f(R) =
N∑
k=1
g (Rak − bk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Difference caused by noise
(5)
Using the squared `2-norm for g(·) the following ML-
based optimization problem can be stated:
R∗ = arg min
R∈SO(3)
‖RA−B‖2 (6)
Other possible choices for g(·) can be found in [10] by
constructing the induced norms from the metrics described
therein.
Closed form solution
In [9] an iterative approach was used to solve the problem
stated in 6. In the following section a closed form solution is
derived, allowing further insight in the geometric properties
and conditioning of the problem.
The side condition R ∈ SO(3) is a more special case of
R ∈ O(3) (O(n) = {X ∈ Rn×n|XTX = I}). Since the
latter condition implies 6 equalities due to symmetry (the
diagonal elements of RRT to be one and the other ones to
be zero), a compact version using a matrix Λ ∈ Sym(3) =
{X ∈ R3×3|X = XT } can be stated as follows:
h(R) = tr(Λ(RRT − I)) = 0 (7)
Λ collects the Lagrange Multipliers. By constructing h(·)
as stated above, all six equality constraints are summed up.
Setting this sum to zero is a more relaxed but still necessary
condition compared to stating them separately. The Lagrange
cost function reads:
L(R,Λ) = ‖RA−B‖2 + tr(Λ(RRT − I)) (8)
Following the common approach, the gradient w.r.t. R
reads:
1
2
∇RL(R,Λ) = R(AAT + Λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lhs
− BAT︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=C=rhs
= 0 (9)
The side condition (R to be orthogonal) can be used in a
tricky way to solve for Λ. The transpose of the right hand
side (rhs) of the above equation is multiplied from the left.
The term containing R cancels out. The remaining term in
brackets is symmetric (due to the redundancy in Λ). The
result reads:
(AAT + Λ) = (CTC)
1
2 (10)
Combining this result with Eq. 9 yields:
R(CTC)
1
2 = C (11)
Using a singular value decomposition for C := UΣV T
the result can be further simplified. Due to the properties of
U and V (both in O(3)) the following result can be stated:
RV Σ = UΣ (12)
To finally solve for R the matrix Σ = diag(σ1, σ2, σ3),
has to be further investigated. Without loss of generality, the
singular values are ordered decreasingly. Three cases can be
distinguished, since if at least one measurement is available,
the minimum rank of C is one.
1) All singular values are unequal to 0:
Σ is invertible. The result for R reads:
R
′
= UV T (13)
To ensure that a proper rotation matrix (the constraint
det(R) = 1 was not taken into account so far) is derived,
the following “normalization” has to be performed:
R = Udiag(1, 1, det(UV T ))V T (14)
2) One singular value is equal to 0:
This corresponds to the case, where the set of {ak}Nk=1
or {bk}Nk=1 span only 2 dimensions. Since the goal of the
optimization is to rotate one coordinate system onto the
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Fig. 2: Sum of Singular Value based detection of anomalies
with noisy measurements (noise variance is 10 degree2)
other, this information is enough, since the missing one is
uniquely determined. The result for R therefore is the same
as in previous case.
3) Two singular values are equal to 0:
This case occurs, if only one direction is present in either
{ak}Nk=1 or {bk}Nk=1. If more than one measurement is
available, this is very unlikely for the almanac data. If
the measurements however span only one dimension, an
anomaly is very likely, which makes an attitude determination
impossible.
ANOMALY DETECTION
As stated in the previous section, an inspection of the
singular values of C = BAT can be used to detect
anomalies. Different possible methods are described in the
following section.
Sum of Singular Values
Since the vectors are normalized to one, the sum of all
singular values in the noise free case is equal to the size of
N = |K| = |I∩J |. This property can be used for inspection:
In the case of noisy measurements, the normalized sum can
be computed, yielding values from 0 to 1. If the resulting
metric is below a certain threshold τsum,sing an anomaly is
very likely. Fig. 2 depicts an example with moderate noise,
where the approach works. A blue background indicates the
groundtruth. A raised flag indicates the detection.
Fig. 3 depicts simulated results with higher noise (a
variance of 25 degree), where the same threshold was used.
Due to the noise, a reliable detection cannot be performed
anymore. The same epochs were used for turning the spoofer
on (indicated by the black background again). The detection-
flag is indicated in blue.
Comparison with Almanac Geometry
On the one hand, the ratio of the singular values of C
depends on the presence of a spoofer or repeater, i.e. if all
measured unit vectors bj are collinear, only one singular
value is big compared to the others. On the other hand also
the geometry of the almanac DoAs determines this ratio.
Therefore a comparison of the singular values of CB =
BBT := V BΣBV
T
B with the ones of the geometry only
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Fig. 3: Sum of Singular Value based detection of anomalies
with noisy measurements (noise variance is 25 degree2)
Fig. 4: Block diagram of the basic snapshot based algorithm
matrix CA = AAT := V AΣAV TA seems a valid candidate
for indicating the presence of an anomaly.
The difference of the singular values of di = 1N |σA,i −
σB,i| can be used to compare the subspaces and identify the
affected ones. If a subspace is identified, the corresponding
singular vector (either for the almanac or the coordinate
frame) can be used directly, since it reflects the repeaters
direction.
SNAPSHOT BASED ATTITUDE ESTIMATION
A block diagram of the basic snapshot based algorithm
is depicted in Fig. 4. Additionally, the algorithm returns
a quality metric q ranging from 0 to 1 and an indication
about spoofing by generating a flag sspo by using one of the
previously described methods.
First the performance is analyzed using simulated data sets.
A random almanac consisting of N unit vectors is generated.
Afterwards a random attitude is generated by choosing a
unit vector for the rotation axis and a scalar rotation angle
randomly. The almanac unit vectors are then rotated by this
attitude, yielding {bperfk }Nk=1. Finally the measurements are
generated by again generating a random rotation (with the
constraint, that the rotation axis is orthogonal to bk).
Optionally a spoofer can be turned on for specified simula-
tion runs. This will affect the measured signals to be arriving
all from the same direction, before noise is added. For the
described examples, the affected simulations are the ones in
the intervals [200, 400], [650, 800] and [1000, 1500].
Fig. 5 shows some exemplary results for 2000 different
runs using a noise variance of 5 and 6 reference angles. Fig.
5 shows the same setup for only 3 almanac measurements.
The runs where a spoofer was active are indicated by a blue
background.
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Fig. 5: Difference to reference for roll, pitch and yaw in
degree; The noise variance was 5 degree2 and N = 6
Fig. 6 depicts the resulting normalized singular values for
this example.
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Fig. 6: Normalized singular values of C; The noise
variance was 5 degree2 and N = 6
Fig. 7 shows the resulting SVD based metric and the
detection flag.
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Fig. 7: Quality metric and returend spoofing flag; The noise
variance was 5 degree2 and N = 6
Again 2000 runs were performed using only 3 signals with
a three times higher noise variance of 15 degree. Fig. 8 shows
the resulting error of the attitude angles compared to the
reference. The number of signals is to low to perform an
estimate with such a big noise.
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Fig. 8: Difference to reference for roll, pitch and yaw in
degree; The noise variance was 15 degree2 and N = 3
Fig. 9 depicts the corresponding singular values. When
spoofing is active, σ2 again almost vanishes, but not com-
pletely due to the noise.
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Fig. 9: Normalized singular values of C; The noise
variance was 15 degree2 and N = 3
Spoofing detection is still almost always reliably possible,
as depicted in Fig. 10.
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Fig. 10: Quality metric and returend spoofing flag; The
noise variance was 15 degree2 and N = 3
SEQUENTIAL ATTITUDE ESTIMATION
Having a sequence of measurements for the direction of
arrivals for each tracked PRN (B(n)), it is convenient that
they follow a random process, i.e. for different time instances
n they are not independent. This fact can be used to gain more
robust estimates of the underlying attitude of the platform
denoted by R(n) compared to a snapshot based approach. In
order to be able to realize a sequential estimator, states and
measurements have to be defined. [7] used a simple Kalman
Filter, whereas in the following a different approach will be
described.
A. First order Movement Model
A first order movement model is considered first to de-
scribe the evolution of the platforms attitude over discrete
time instances n. The model is defined as follows:
R(n+ 1) = RN (n)R(n) (15)
RN (n) denotes a random rotation matrix. It is constructed
using an arbitrary rotation axis ω(n) with ‖ω(n)‖ = 1
and a certain rotation angle α(n) ∼ N (0, σα). The rotation
matrix can then be constructed using Rodrigues’ formula
(R(ω, α) = I + sin(α)[ω]x + (1− cos(α))[ω]2x).
B. Second order Movement Model
An extension is added to the first order model to be able to
describe the tendency of rotation. Therefore the rotation axis
is not allowed to change arbitrary between the time instances.
The change in rotation is again modeled by a random rotation
matrix matrix RNω (n). This matrix will be randomly chosen
from SO(3).
ω(n+ 1) = RNωω(n) (16)
Also due to conservation of energy which corresponds
to the angular velocity, the current pose angle α(n) is not
allowed to change arbitrary. This can be modeled as follows:
α(n+ 1) = α(n) + ηα(n) (17)
Again using Rodriguez Formula yielding RNω (n), a ran-
dom state transition reads:
R(n+ 1) = RN2(n)R(n) (18)
C. Simple Constrained Based Approach
Both movement models constrain the change of the plat-
forms attitude for two successive time instances. A certain
cost function Φ(·, ·) is used to measure this distance. In [10]
different proper metrics are discussed. The following one is
used for the described approach:
Φ(R(n+ 1),R(n)) = ‖R(n+ 1)−R(n)‖2 (19)
This cost function is added to the original cost function by
a trade-off parameter , which “weights” both objectives:
R(n+ 1)∗ =arg min
R(n+1)∈SO(3)
1
N
‖R(n+ 1)B −A‖2
(20)
+ ‖R(n+ 1)−R(n)‖2
Using the same technique as for the snapshot based ap-
proach, the final solution is given by:
R(n+ 1) = U sdiag(1, 1,det(U sV Ts ))V
T
s (21)
U s and V s denote the corresponding matrices of the
singular value decomposition of Cs = U sΣsV Ts , where
Cs =
1
NBA
T + R(n) now includes the estimate of the
previous time instant.
Finally the objective function consists of a “data fit” term
and a “regularization” term. This approach is commonly used
in image processing techniques (i.e. optical flow estimation).
Additional smoothness constraints may be added (e.g. con-
straints on the change rate of the attitude to incorporate the
dynamics of the second order movement model).
When employing the overall algorithm depicted in Fig.
11, the parameter  has to chosen according to the estimated
platform dynamics. The previous attitude is stored in a “state
buffer”.
Fig. 11: Main block diagram of the sequential attitude
estimator.
MITIGATION
A robust spoofing detection scheme based on the sequential
estimation of the array attitude has been presented in the
previous section. The attitude estimation problem at each esti-
mation epoch is performed by using an SVD-based technique
delivering closed-form solution for the problem. It is also
shown that the spread of singular values can be used to detect
anomalies in the measured satellite DoAs. These anomalies
can be caused by the noise or structural interference, e.g.
spoofing, and therefore can be used for detecting spoofing
attacks. The practical use of this method for detecting the
presence of the signals of a GPS repeater is illustrated by
Fig. 17. In the figure it can be observed that in the presence
of the repeater signals a single strong singular value prevails
while the other two singular values are very close to zero.
The large spread between singular values obtained while
solving for the antenna array attitude (see Equation 12)
gives an indication that a strong correlation exists between
the unit vectors of the measured DoAs in the matrix B. In
order to prove this a matrix D = BTB of size N × N
can be computed and tested for the non-diagonal elements
close to unity. The non-diagonal elements are dot-products
or cross-correlation factors between the different unit
vectors of measured satellite DoAs. For a nominal satellite
constellation these products are seldom close to unity since
the presence of two or more satellites on the close positions
in the sky is quite unlikely. In rare cases when this may
nominally occur, a cross-check with the DoAs calculated
from ephemeris or system almanac can be performed. If all
checks above prove the anomaly condition, the direction
of arrival of the structural interference can be estimated as
the mean of the corresponding strongly correlated DoAs.
The mitigation of the detected interference can then be
performed by using a combination of a sub-space projection
and eigenbeamforming [11] as described in the following
part.
The estimated direction of the interference is described
by an unit vector in R3. Before it can by applied for
mitigation, this unit vector has to be projected into the
antennas signalspace (see Fig.1). The mapping is specific for
the geometry of the antenna. A generic description is given
by M : R3 7→ CL where L corresponds to the number of
antennas. The corresponding signal reads:
sRFI =M(bRFI) (22)
Subspace projection:
Π⊥ = I − sRFI(sHRFIsRFI)−1sRFI (23)
y = Π⊥x (24)
where Π⊥ ∈ CL×L is a sub-space projection matrix, and
x ∈ CL×1 and y ∈ CL×1 are the array signal vectors before
and after sub-space projection, correspondingly;
Eigenbeamforming:
Cyy = E[yy
H ] (25)
yBF = w
Hy (26)
where Cyy ∈ CL×L is the array covariance matrix cal-
culated after the sub-space projection, w ∈ CL×1 is the
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the
matrix Cyy, yBF ∈ C is the beamformers output that can be
used by receiver tracking loops.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The described methods are compared to the previous
approaches in [9] and [7]. The same data set is available.
A detailed description on how the data sets were collected
can be found in the aforementioned references. All data sets
where collected using DLR’s multi-antenna GNSS receiver
GALANT.
D. Nominal Case
The first data set was recorded placing GALANT antenna
on the rooftop of the institute. Fig. 12 depicts the estimated
attitude using the snapshot based approach compared to the
iterative version in terms of absolute differences. Fig. 12
depicts the negligible difference, which is most likely caused
by numerical effects.
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Fig. 12: Difference to iterative approach for the nominal
case for roll, pitch and yaw.
The resulting SVD based quality metric for this nominal
case is shown in Fig. 13. It is almost one for all periods,
corresponding to a clean correlation between the almanac
and measured DoAs.
Epochs
0 500 1000 1500 2000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
SVD Flag
SVD Metric
Fig. 13: SVD based quality metric for the nominal case.
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Fig. 14: Difference to iterative approach for the static
repeater for roll, pitch and yaw.
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Fig. 15: SVD quality measurement (green) and spoofing
flag (blue background).
E. Static Repeater
The repeater was realized connecting a GPS-L1 receiver
antenna to a transmit antenna via an adjustable amplifier. The
transmit antenna was attached to a balloon, which was fixed
to ground, yielding a stationary setup.
The receiver under test was placed at a certain distance
next to the balloon, allowing the reception of the nominal and
repeated signals. The repeater was turned on after a certain
period (epoch 376) and turned off (epoch 853) again.
The difference to the iterative approach is depicted in Fig.
14.
Differences are big in the time the repeater is turned on.
The detection of that period is possible using the SVD based
metric. The metric is depicted in Fig. 15. A blue background
corresponds to a raised flag. The threshold was set to 0.8.
A comparison between the snapshot based approach and
the smoothing approach is shown in Fig. 16. A slight loss in
dynamic of the sequential version is recognizable.
In that case all signals are captured by the repeater, which
is reflected by the distribution of the singular values shown in
Fig. 17. The values are normalized by the number of available
measurements for that time instant. Only one dominant
singular value remains when the spoofer is turned on. As
previously described, the corresponding left singular value
corresponds to the spoofers direction in the local antenna
frame and can be used for post-correlation nulling.
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Fig. 16: Snapshot based approach compared to smoothing
approach ( = 1).
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Fig. 17: Normalized singular values of the snapshot based
approach.
F. Dynamic Repeater
The same setup was used as for the static case. The receiver
under test was mounted on the rooftop of the measurement
vehicle. The vehicle moved towards the repeater, turned and
moved away again. The repeater was turned on all the time
with constant transmit power (see [7] for more details and
pictures).
Fig. 18 shows the difference compared to the iterative
approach, which is high during the period the receiver is
near the repeater (i.e. affected by the repeater).
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Fig. 18: Difference to iterative approach for the dynamic
repeater for roll, pitch and yaw.
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Fig. 19: SVD quality measurement (green) and spoofing
flag (blue background).
Fig. 19 depicts the quality monitor and spoofing flag.
Compared to the static case, no reliable threshold can be
set.
Fig. 20 depicts the comparison for the yaw angle of the
snapshot and smoothed approach. The missing modeling of
higher order movement (i.e. yaw rate) limits the dynamics
of the sequential estimator, whereas an estimate is calculated
although the receiver is influenced by the repeater.
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Fig. 20: Snapshot based approach compared to smoothing
approach ( = 1).
The normalized singular values of the snapshot based
approach are depicted in Fig. 21. In contrast to the static
case, no clear dominant subspace can be identified.
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Fig. 21: Distribution of the normalized singular values.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
A computationally efficient algorithm has been developed
exploiting the underlying geometry. Only one singular value
decomposition per measurement is necessary, whereas the
iterative approach of [9] uses one matrix inversion per
iteration. An implementation in real time for DLR’s multi-
antanne receiver GALANT is currently performed.
Furthermore the results of the SVD can directly be used to
inspect the quality of the measurements and current satellite
geometry. A metric based on the strength of the correlation
of the received and almanac based DoAs could be used in
reliable way to test for anomalies, i.e. spoofing. The dominant
subspace of the spoofer is directly given by the strongest left
singular vector and can be used for mitigation at tracking
level.
Finally a low complexity constraint based sequential esti-
mator was presented. The overhead compared to the snapshot
based approach is just one 3×3 matrix addition. Experimental
data show a more robust behavior, although a certain latency
is added.
Future work will focus on the following issues:
1) The practical verification of the proposed mitigation
technique by implementing it in real time.
2) The offline calibration of the antenna array, to gain
more accurate, i.e. unbiased, measurements for low
elevations.
3) The extension of the sequential estimation to higher
order movement models.
4) Estimation of the spoofers location in a local east-
north-up coordinate frame.
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